



Abstract: The concept of moral luck appears to be an 
oxymoron, since it indicates that the right- or wrongness of a 
particular action can depend on the agent’s good or bad luck. 
That goes against the assumption that the moral quality of 
our conduct, the praise- and blameworthiness of what we do, 
should only hinge on factors that are within our own control. 
It seems unreasonable to let the moral verdict of someone’s 
decision and action depend on whether the outcome happens 
to be good or bad, particularly in situations where luck plays 
a significant part in how things turn out. In organizational 
life, moral luck nevertheless is a recurring phenomenon, 
in that actual outcomes do affect our moral evaluations of 
what people do. A reckless person can get away with his or 
her moral gamble if the outcome is good, but will get severe 
criticism in the likely event of a bad outcome. This chapter 
explores how moral luck connects to the normative theories of 
duty ethics and utilitarianism, and the extent to which moral 
evaluations based on actual outcomes are acceptable.
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An entrepreneur needs backing from his investors to start a business 
venture in the far north of Norway. The venture will provide much 
needed activity in the local community, and create hundreds of jobs to 
people who have been unemployed for a long time. One key element 
in the story the entrepreneur has told his investors is that he will have 
a strategic relationship with a multinational customer from day one. 
The day before finalizing the investment, the customer announces that 
they are backing out. If the entrepreneur informs the investors about 
this negative development, they are likely to withdraw from the project. 
Should he nevertheless tell them now, or wait until the first board meet-
ing, after the money from the investors is in the bank?
The entrepreneur can turn to duty ethics and utilitarianism for guid-
ance in this situation. From a duty ethics perspective, to keep the inves-
tors out of the information loop is morally unacceptable. It does not help 
that the outcome is likely to generate work and be good for the local 
community. Duty ethics encourages the decision maker to consider how 
he would want anybody else in a similar position to behave. Would it be 
morally acceptable if all entrepreneurs withheld information from their 
financial partners in such situations? No, is the answer coming from 
duty ethics, since no rational person can will that deception becomes the 
standard way to act in such situations, without becoming inconsistent, 
making exceptions for him- or herself. Furthermore, the act of keeping 
crucial information from the investors would be an example of using 
them as mere means to achieve financial success and create jobs, and 
as such, it would be morally unacceptable from the perspective of the 
humanity formulation of the categorical imperative.
A utilitarian can see things differently, and will take into account that 
the project will create important jobs and activity in a poor community. 
Keeping the information away from the investors might be necessary in 
order to maximize utility for all concerned, and promote the common 
good. However, the case can illustrate a split amongst the utilitarians. 
Some of them share the duty ethical concerns about universality. What 
if everybody in business started to keep information away from their 
own investors and business partners? That would create environments of 
distrust, and cause bad outcomes in the long term. Other utilitarians are 
not concerned about this aspect of the situation, and focuses instead on 
the here and now. The split in the utilitarian ranks is real. One fraction 
is called rule utilitarianism, and it proposes a two-step decision-making 
process: First, identify the rule of action that will generate the most 
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utility and common good in situations like these, and then act in accord-
ance with that rule. They agree with duty ethics in the entrepreneur case, 
and advise him to be transparent and open with the investors, since that 
would be to follow the rule most likely to maximize utility in such situ-
ations. If every entrepreneur started to keep bad news from their inves-
tors, it is likely that it would have created mistrust in their relations, and 
the overall outcome would have been negative. The alternative theoreti-
cal fraction is called act utilitarianism, and it maintains that the simple 
principle to follow is to choose the available course of action that will 
maximize utility. The entrepreneur should keep the information about 
the customer withdrawal to himself, since openness would jeopardize 
the project to create jobs in the far north of Norway. This should not 
be mistaken for an egoistic argument, since it is out of concern for the 
common good and the inhabitants of the local community that it would 
be right for the entrepreneur to keep the information to himself.
The story about the entrepreneur and his investors continues. He 
decided not to share the information about the loss of the customer to 
his investors, and the project gets underway. New customers arrive quite 
early in the process, and the project becomes a success, creating profits 
for the investors and new jobs for local people. The business venture was 
the starting point for social development and growth in the community. 
Hundreds of people now have a good income and can remain with 
their families in their local community. At the ten-year anniversary of 
the project, the entrepreneur drew attention to the opening incident, 
when he was in serious doubt about telling his investors or not about 
the customer withdrawal. Now he can look back and be relieved that 
he did not follow the moral intuition to be open and transparent with 
the investors. To this day, he is convinced that they would have taken 
their money elsewhere if he had told them about the negative develop-
ment. The project would have collapsed, and there would have been no 
new jobs in the local community. He believes that the actual positive 
outcome justifies the decision to keep quiet. He thinks that the overall 
consequences in terms of benefits to the local community prove that he 
was right in doing so.
The extent to which we agree with the entrepreneur’s evaluation 
depend on our stance on what we can call moral luck. The philosophers 
Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981) introduced the concept 
of moral luck, with the intention of identifying a tension in our moral 
reasoning. On the one hand, we believe that morality is immune to luck, 
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in the sense that people are only morally responsible for aspects of their 
behaviour that have been within their control. It seems unreasonable 
to blame or praise someone for actions and outcomes that largely have 
come about through a set of fortunate or unfortunate circumstances. On 
the other hand, the actual outcomes of what people to tend to colour our 
evaluations of their conduct. Theoretically, we may be convinced about 
the moral irrelevance of luck, but in practice, we discriminate and judge 
based on actual outcomes.
One domestic example we can use to illustrate moral luck is that of 
drunk driving. Two guests who have drunk considerable amounts of 
alcohol at a party may both foolishly decide to drive home in their cars. 
They are equally to blame for exposing other people to the risk of seri-
ous harm and death. One drunk driver gets home safely without hurt-
ing anybody, while the other hits and kills a pedestrian while driving 
on a red light at a street crossing. The former is likely to get off more 
lightly than the latter, both legally and morally. From a legal perspec-
tive, it makes sense to distinguish between the two cases, but morally 
it seems that both deserve equal amounts of blame and criticism. Both 
have put other people at risk, in exactly the same manner. In general, we 
can be convinced that there is no morally relevant difference between 
the two cases, but in reality, it is commonplace to distinguish between 
them, and even shrug at the former driver’s behaviour. There seems to 
be an unsatisfactory imbalance, then, between our moral theory and our 
moral practice.
Michaelson (2008) has studied moral luck in a business context, using 
as his main example the pharmaceutical company Merck and their devel-
opment of medicine to cure river blindness, a plague affecting millions 
of poor people in river-dwelling communities in West Africa and Latin 
America. The company made the decision to invest in the development 
of the medicine under a cloud of uncertainty, not knowing if it would 
ever become profitable and of any help to the sufferers of the disease. 
The project has proved to be both profitable and effective in treating the 
disease. Since the program began in 1987, more than 40 million people 
annually, in 30 different countries, have benefitted from the medicine, 
and Merck have committed itself to manufacture and distribute it for 
as long as river blindness exists. The company and its executives have 
received praise and recognition for their efforts, although the outcome 
has depended upon factors well beyond their control. Due to good moral 
luck, the initial decision to invest and develop the medicine turned into a 
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success story of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. With 
a negative outcome, the responsible executives would most likely have 
received criticism for wasting the investors’ and the owners’ money to 
no avail.
The research literature acknowledges three categories of moral luck. 
The most prominent one is resultant moral luck, where the entrepreneur 
story from the north of Norway and Merck and the river blindness medi-
cine are examples. Then there is constitutive moral luck, which has to 
do with the elements affecting a person’s character. Nature and nurture, 
genetic heritage and culture, can affect the extent to which a person is 
respectful, honest, kind, and benevolent in his or her interactions with 
other people. Good or bad luck plays a significant part in the formative 
processes, yet we tend not to take it into account when praising or blam-
ing people for the character traits they have. The third category goes 
under the name of situational moral luck, and concerns the moral tests 
a person faces or avoids, and the extent to which character traits become 
publicly exposed. A person can be morally fortunate to never face situ-
ations where her moral weaknesses are exposed, or morally unfortunate 
to never get a chance to demonstrate personal courage and honesty, 
since the situations she faces do not call for the application these moral 
qualities.
There is room for a fourth category of moral luck, not yet identified 
or discussed in the studies of this phenomenon. We can call it relational 
moral luck, and it concerns the social environment a person finds him- 
or herself in at the time of decision-making. At crucial points in the 
process of judging and reasoning about what to do, the decision-maker 
depends on feedback from others, in the form of support or opposition 
to the ideas that are on the table. In an organization, he or she needs 
colleagues who intervene and question the assumptions that are present 
in the reasoning. I return to the concept of relational moral luck in the 
final chapter of the book, where I dwell more explicitly on the nature 
of the thought processes that lead from contemplation of options and 
alternatives, to action, and the extent to which their quality depends on 
the social side of decision-making.
To what extent does moral luck pose a challenge to the coherence of 
our moral reasoning? Nagel and Williams thought that they identified 
a deep tension in the way we think about right and wrong when they 
introduced the concept. Moral luck is no doubt a thought-provoking 
concept and can serve as a reminder that success and failure often 
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depends on factors beyond our own control. However, I do not think the 
philosophers who launched it actually managed to reveal any profound 
inconsistencies in our moral thinking. Rather, the examples of moral 
luck indicate that we sometimes mistakenly let actual outcomes affect 
our evaluations of character and conduct. These evaluations do not 
appear to survive careful analysis. The considered view we are likely to 
reach is that success does not justify lying to an investor, that the conduct 
of the two drunk drivers are equally morally wrong, and that we can 
judge the Merck initiative to cure river blindness independently of the 
actual outcome. Moral luck would have been much more troubling if 
there were tensions between what we take to be the correct evaluations 
of conduct, and the general assumptions we have about right and wrong. 
The main value of the concept is that it can serve as a reminder of how 
outcomes affect our moral judgements, and that we have good reasons to 
correct them when they do.
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